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The issue of ￿scal coordination in a Monetary Union is recurrent as monetary policy can no
longer be used as a national stabilization policy instrument. We measure the increase in welfare due
to the coordination of ￿scal policies in the typical Neo-Keynesian environment, where monetary
policy would have signi￿cantive and persistent real e⁄ects. We propose a decomposition of coor-
dination gains into a deterministic and a stochastic parcel. We show that the deterministic ￿scal
coordination gain is high but that the stochastic gain, often called stabilization gain, is very small
generating, for our calibration, an increase of 0.0161 percentage points, measured in consumption
equivalents.
1 Introduction
In the Neo-Keynesian literature, the main objective of policy is the stabilization of economies that
are subject to shocks. Moreover, gains that occur when two or more countries coordinate their policies
are called stabilization gains. The motivation of this paper came from the idea that when countries
join a monetary union they loose monetary policy as a stabilization policy instrument. Hence, it
is important to substitute it by a ￿scal instrument. To avoid spillovers that independent choices of
policy could be undertaken, there are some who advise for a central decision on state contingent ￿scal
policies, namely when countries are subject to asymmetric shocks.
In this paper we aim not only to clarify the conceptual distinction between stabilization and
coordination gains, but mainly to assess quantitatively the importance both concepts.
We extend the method developed in Salvado (2009). However, di⁄erently from that study, we use
an environment more directly comparable with most of the Neo-Keynesian literature, where stabiliza-
tion policy with monetary instruments have the highest possibilities. That is, we introduce nominal
rigidities that have persistence e⁄ects due to pricing technologies that impose the setting of prices for
more than one period.
The increase in welfare within a Monetary Union is measured, following the change from an
independent ￿scal policy in every country, to the decision of ￿scal policy by a common policy maker,
that is, the coordinated ￿scal policy. We divide this increase in welfare into a deterministic e⁄ect,
that accounts for the elimination of country strategic interactions that occur in the steady-state, and
￿E-mail address: ssalvado@fe.unl.pt
yThe present work is part of my PhD research. I would like to thank Prof. Isabel Horta Correia for her comments
and suggestions.
1a stochastic e⁄ect that measures the gain when policies take into account the shocks that occur in
the economies. This last e⁄ect depends on the direct e⁄ect of the shock, that is usually related to
stabilization, and also to the elimination of the strategic interaction among countries that is derived
through the volatility of the shock. We show that deterministic gains represent an increase of around
17% in consumption equivalents1 and that the stochastic component is very small, representing an
increase of around 0:0161 p.p., in consumption equivalents.
We consider a model composed of two identical countries, where each country produces a tradeable
composite good using labor (that is immobileacross countries) with a linear technology, that is subject
to shocks. Prices are set ￿ la Calvo. Households consume every good and are subject to a cash-in-
advance constraint on the purchase of both goods. As such, we use a monetary model where money is
used for unit of account and transaction, but we consider that monetary policy is decided at the union
level such that the monetary distortion is minimized. Government consumption, in every country, is
limited to national produced goods, and is ￿nanced by a distortionary tax on labor income. As said
before these two countries belong to a monetary union, where ￿scal policy is initially implemented at
a domestic level.
With the purpose of simpli￿cation of the interaction analyzed in this model we consider that the
monetary policy is implemented independently from ￿scal policy2. Regarding ￿scal policy, we ￿rst
consider the case where each country￿ s government does not take into account the e⁄ects of its actions
on the other country￿ s government policy (that represents the Nash equilibrium) and compare it with
the case where ￿scal policy is implemented in a coordinated manner (that represents the cooperative
equilibrium). However, notice that in the coordinated case, we consider that ￿scal policy is decided by
a supranational authority that could implement di⁄erent policies for di⁄erent countries. Di⁄erently
from monetary policy that is coordinated and harmonized in the monetary union, ￿scal policy makers
in both institutions are free to discriminate across countries.
Moreover, we describe the source of cooperative gains, that is, the welfare di⁄erence between the
coordinated and the non-coordinated situations, from the fact that both countries have an incentive
to deviate from the coordinated solution. If a country increases its tax rate it can increase its terms of
trade in order to get a better trade gain. This will reduce labor e⁄ort. When every country follows the
same strategy, terms of trade will not change and tax distortions increase leading to a lower welfare in
the Nash equilibrium. As such, the main objective is to measure the amount of this loss in stochastic
economies with nominal rigidities.
To compute coordination gains3 we proceed as follows. For the measurement of the deterministic
component, as nominal rigidities are not active, the economy works like the ￿ exible price one. Since
with ￿ exible prices the model has a closed form solution, we can precisely measure the coordination
gain, by computing the welfare di⁄erences from the Nash and the Cooperative equilibrium. Next, we
compute the gain derived from the stochastic component when shocks are added to the economy, since
the optimal solution will be solved numerically in deviations from the deterministic steady state.
1In comparison to the Nash case.
2We suppose that ￿ = 1 is the target.
3We explain in detail this methodology in Salvado (2009).
2Notice that, when imposing a Calvo price setting4 the procedure to compute the coordination gain
is not straightforward. We would like to highlight that we do not use any approximation prior to the
optimization procedure, that is, prior to the conditions that de￿ne the choice of policies. As such, after
de￿ning the set of equations that characterize the equilibrium, we use this set of equations, mostly
non-linear ones, as restrictions to our cooperative and Nash problems. It is only after deriving ￿rst
order conditions of these problems, that we solve them by linear approximation. We consider a ￿rst
order approximation of the variables around the corresponding optimal steady-state5.
Our work is in line with the Ramsey literature, where the optimal ￿scal policy is the one that
results from a benevolent planner6 that chose among all feasible equilibrium set of allocations.
In this literature, all the dynamics in the Ramsey equilibrium are solved by a ￿rst or n￿order
Taylor approximation towards the Ramsey steady-states. However, as argued in Schmitt-GrohØ and
Uribe (2005), "the exact solution is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the one based on a ￿rst-order
approximation". Hence, we consider a ￿rst-order approximation in our model. As these authors show,















is equivalent to its deterministic steady-state, since ￿
does not depend on the distribution of the shock. Therefore, in the presence of a shock, the certainty
equivalent occurs and shock volatility does not contaminate average utility. When the approximation




di⁄ers from the deterministic steady-state, not because ￿ and ￿ depend on shocks, but because the














Parallel to these articles, there is the literature that uses the Linear Quadratic Method as an
approximation technique. This method was used by Benigno and Benigno (2006) to measure gains
from monetary cooperation, by Ferrero (2007) to measure the gain of pursuing debt stabilization and
by Gali and Monacelli (2007) to measure ￿scal stabilization gains in a Monetary Union. As explained in
Salvado (2009) the problem of this method is that it measures stabilization as the quadratic di⁄erence
towards a target that does not necessarily re￿ ects the optimal level that can be pursued.
Gali and Monacelli (2007) has a very similar environment to the one used in this article and is
therefore our benchmark. In their model the Monetary Union is composed by a continuum of countries
and they consider lump-sum taxes and a Calvo price setting. They compare two types of policies:
the optimal cooperative policy and the non-coordinated policy. They conclude that without ￿scal
coordination there is no stabilization of the output and ￿scal gap at the aggregate level. As the ￿scal
gap is not stabilized, the aggregate price level has ine¢ cient ￿ uctuations which makes the Central
Bank to ine¢ ciently trade-o⁄ between output gap and in￿ ation volatility.
4Or any other characteristic that generates a dynamic environment.
5To compute the policy functions, impulse responses and other moments we use the package of Christiano (1998).
6In this case, in the coordinated equilibrium the sum of the utilities of both countries is not the same of the repre-
sentative agent, since he does not exist in general.
3Another point worth mentioning is that these authors pay little attention to quantifying the gain
derived from achieving coordination, that is, the loss reduction from moving from a non-coordinated
policy to the optimal cooperative policy. These authors consider it to be "quantitatively small", but
give no idea of its quanti￿cation. Moreover, considering that coordination gains are the di⁄erence from
the stabilization gains that occur under coordination and non-coordination, it would be interesting to
analyze the origin of its magnitude.
Ferrero (2007) does not account for the gain of a coordinated ￿scal policy, he compares di⁄erent
￿scal policies always in a decentralized framework. That is, in his ￿scal policy stabilization gain, he
is concerned with the gain derived from using ￿scal policy in order to stabilize a economy when it is
hit by an asymmetric shock, relative to the situation of only using ￿scal policy to obtain a balanced
budget.
This paper is organized as follows. First we present the economy considering that ￿rms set prices
￿ la Calvo. Then, we compute the conditions that de￿ne the best policy when ￿scal policy is chosen
by a common authority and compare it to the conditions that characterize the best policy when ￿scal
instruments are chosen at the country level. The welfare di⁄erence of these two equilibria is the gain
from ￿scal cooperation. Additionally, computing the gain that would occur in the steady-state, allow
us to decompose our gain in two e⁄ects: the deterministic e⁄ect and the e⁄ect that occurs due to
shocks. We consider various scenarios for the occurrence of the shock and ￿nally we measure and
decompose the welfare gain from ￿scal coordination.
2 The Economy
The world has two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F) that have both linear technologies.
Markets have a monopolistic competition structure. Each country is populated by a continuum of
equal consumers with size one and identical preferences. In each period t the economy experiences
one of ￿nitely many events st. The initial realization s0 is given. The set of all possible events in
period t is denoted by St, the history of these events up to and including period t, which we call state
at t, (s0;s1;:::;st), is denoted by st, and the set of all possible states in period t is denoted by St. For
the speci￿c case analyzed, the distribution of these events is identical for every country. Each country
sets their own ￿scal policy, government expenditures and the tax rate paths, and the monetary policy
is set by a common Central Bank.
2.1 The Households













where Ct, Gt; Nt, denote respectively private consumption, public consumption and labor. We assume

































Note that the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is equal to one. However,
the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent varieties of a given good is given by ￿ > 1. We assume
that this parameter is the same for the two countries8.
2.1.1 Demand Functions and Price Indexes















































1￿￿. Since this two goods are
tradeables, in the Monetary Union we have that PH = P￿
H and PF = P￿
F.

















8For the foreign country, C
￿































9Equivalent expressions are obtained for the households of country F.



























































represent the terms of trade in F (H).
We consider the timing as in Lucas (1982). At the beginning of period t, households in country H,
hold nominal wealth Wt. In the asset markets they have asses to nominal balances, Mt, noncontingent
debt issued by the two countries BHt + BFt and private state-contingent debt Et fQt;t+1Bt+1g that
cannot be traded among countries. The price of this last asset is Qt;t+1, that represents the price at
date t when the state of the world is st, of a bond paying one unit of currency at date t+1 if the state
of the world is st+1. Thus,
Mt + BHt + BFt + Et fQt;t+1Bt+1g ￿ Wt (13)
Afterwards, good markets open and they buy consumption goods, restricted to the following cash-
in-advance constraint:
PHtCHt + PFtCFt ￿ Mt
Finally, at the end of period t, they receive labor income net of taxes, (1 ￿ ￿t)WtNt, seigniorage




all asset returns. Therefore, wealth in the beginning of next period is:
Wt+1 = Mt + (BHt + BFt)Rt + Bt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t)WtNt + Zt +
1 Z
0
￿t (i)di ￿ PHtCHt ￿ PFtCFt
Therefore, in country H households choose fCHt;CFt;Nt;Mt;BHt;BFt;Bt+1g
1
t=0 in order to max-














, subject to the following budget
constraint,
PHtCHt + PFtCFt + Mt+1 + BHt+1 + BFt+1 + Et+1 fQt+1;t+2Bt+2g ￿




and to the cash-in-advance condition:
PHtCHt + PFtCFt ￿ Mt
6The households in country F have an identical problem.
From the ￿rst order conditions of the households problem we obtain the Euler equation (equation
(15)), the intertemporal condition of the state contingent debt (equation (16)) and two intratemporal



























From (15) and (16) and taking expectations we can get the usual non-arbitarge condition Rt =
1
EtQt;t+1.
2.2 National Fiscal Authorities
The ￿scal authority in the home country taxes labor income at the rate ￿. The budget constraint
of the home ￿scal authority10 is:
￿tWtNt + BHt = PHtGt + BHt￿1Rt￿1 (19)
where Gt represent public consumption of the domestically produced good. For any given level of Gt








The foreign ￿scal authority has a similar budget and the same ￿scal instruments.
2.3 Central Monetary Authority
Each period, the central monetary authority sets the interest rate, Rt; issues money, MU
t and
allocates the seigniorage revenue Zt;Z￿
t to the two countries.
2.4 The Firms
In country H; each ￿rm has the following production function:
Yt (i) = AtNt (i) (21)
where Yt (i) is the production of good i that can be used for private consumption in the home and in
the foreign country (CHt, C￿
Ht) and for public consumption in the home country (Gt). At is a random











t + (BFt￿1 + B
￿
Ft￿1)Rt￿1










7variable that represents aggregate technology in country H. Country F has an analogous production
function (Y ￿
t (j) = A￿
tN￿
t (j)), where Y ￿
t (j) can be used for private consumption in the home and in
the foreign country (CFt, C￿
Ft) and for public consumption in the foreign country (G￿
t).
From the clearing of the market of good i in country H and equations (5), (7) and (20), we can
write that:
Yt(i) = CHt (i) + C￿








Summing for all goods i we obtain the following aggregation:
Yt = CHt + C￿







￿￿1 is aggregate output index for country H.
Doing the same for good j, we obtain:
Y ￿
t = CFt + C￿
Ft + G￿
t (23)
We consider that each ￿rm is a monopolistic producer of one of the di⁄erentiated goods produced in
each country. The price-setting is ￿ la Calvo (1983) and the fraction of ￿rms that set prices optimally
in a given period is given by 1 ￿ ￿. Hence, when a ￿rm has the opportunity to set a new price in
period t, it maximizing the expected discount value of its pro￿ts. For the rest of the ￿rms, we consider
that they just adjust the pre set prices according to the steady-state in￿ ation rate12 ￿H;￿F for ￿rms
in the home country and for ￿rms in the foreign country, respectively. Hence,
PHt(m) = ￿HPHt￿1(m); for ￿rms in country H
PFt(n) = ￿FPFt￿1(n); for ￿rms in country F























































￿Ht+1￿Ht+2:::￿Ht+k; k ￿ 1
1; k = 0
12De￿nitions of in￿ ation rates are given by ￿Ht = PHt=PHt￿1 and ￿Ft = PFt=PFt￿1.






























In the special case of ￿ exible prices, the price chosen by every ￿rm is identical and a constant
markup over marginal costs:







For each state of the world, st and date t, we have the following market clearing conditions:
￿ Goods market:
Yt(i) = CHt (i) + C￿
Ht (i) + Gt (i) (26)
Y ￿
t (j) = CFt (j) + C￿













t ￿ PHt (CHt + C￿
Ht) + PFt (CFt + C￿
Ft) (30)
￿ State contingent nominal bonds market:
1 R
0




t (j)dj = 0 (31)
￿ Non state contingent bonds market:
1 R
0




Ft (j)dj = 0 (32)
3 The equilibrium
The assumption taken in this paper, that the two countries are identical in structure and distri-
bution of shocks, imply a symmetric equilibrium and an identical expected welfare whatever is the
equilibrium with symmetric ￿scal policy instruments. In addition, since we take as given a common
monetary policy and identical distribution of seigniorage, the in￿ uences that a choice of one policy in
one country can have on the equilibrium of the other country, are only determined through terms of
9trade and nominal prices, given the nominal rigidity. Since we consider that the nominal interest rate
is de￿ned ex-ante and therefore constant, this implies that the channel of external assets is reduced in
its importance. This reasoning leads us to simplify the analysis imposing no change of assets either
across countries or between government and households. Therefore we can write the equilibrium of
the trade balance in every date and state as an additional restriction on the equilibrium. It can be
written as,
PHtC￿
Ht = PFtCFt (33)























t=0 that satisfy the following conditions:
Yt = CHt + C￿
Ht + Gt (34)
Y ￿


















































































































































































Notice that we can substitute PFt
PHt of the trade balance (equation (52)) into equations (40) and





The above two equations represent risk sharing in aggregate consumption. Due to the structure of
the economy, imposing balanced trade in each moment in time, is equivalent to imposing consumption
levels of each good equal across countries.
4 Strategy to solve the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria
Most studies in the Neo-Keynesian literature which cannot be solved in closed form (see Salvado
2009) approximate the set of equilibria by loglinearizing and then, depending on the institutions,
compute the optimal equilibrium. Namely, the Linear Quadratic approach in models with distortionary
taxation can be described with the following procedure as in Beningo and Woodford (2005): ￿rst is
computed a second-order approximation to the model structural equations. Then, those approximated
equations are used to solve for the expected discounted value of output as a quadratic function. This
solution can then be used to substitute for the terms proportional to expected discounted output in the
quadratic approximation to expected utility. In this way, it is obtained an approximation to expected
utility which is purely quadratic, that can be seen as a loss function. This loss function can then be
evaluated to second order using an approximate solution for the endogenous variables of the model
that is accurate only to ￿rst order. One is then able to compute a linear approximation to optimal
policy using a simple linear-quadratic methodology.
Here instead we obtain an optimum choice of policies in every institution prior to performing any
type of approximation13. Only afterwards, when we derive all the equations that de￿ne the cooperative
equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium, do we perform a linear approximation around the corresponding
steady-state, to be able to get a numerical solution. Notice that we use a linear approximation since
we rely on the proof of Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2005), where they show that the exact solution of
a model is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from the one based on ￿rst-order approximations.
We proceed to the approximation around the steady-state of the non-stochastic cooperative (and
Nash14) equilibrium of the set of equations that de￿ne the optimum. That is, we take the ￿rst order
Taylor expansion of all the equations that de￿ne the cooperative (and Nash) equilibrium. We consider
that each variable b xt ￿ Xt ￿ X, being X the steady-state of a given variable15.
Given the values for the monetary policy and the choice in this problem of ￿scal policies, the state
is de￿ned in this problem by st = fAt;A￿
tg.
13In both problems we consider a timeless perspective as de￿ned in Woodford (2003).
14We would like to notice that this procedure is done to the cooperative equilibrium and to the Nash equilibrium in
separate.
15We use the numerical method of Christiano (1998) to solve the linear system.
11We assume that shocks evolve according to
b st = Pb st￿1 + "t











with ￿ < 1 and "t is uncorrelated over time and over shocks. For the
numerical simulations we consider that the serial correlation of the technology shock is ￿ = 0:9, that
the standard deviation of both shocks is 0:05 and that the shocks between countries are uncorrelated.
Therefore, the solution to this problem can be described by
b zt = Ab zt￿1 + Bb st
where zt is the vector of all variables in deviations from the steady-state.
We develop the exercise for identical countries: identical technology, identical preferences, identical
initial conditions and identical distributions of state variables.
In all the numeric simulations we use a parametrization common to the literature. As such, we
consider a labor supply elasticity of 2 (’ = 0:5), a markup over marginal costs of 1:2 (￿ = 6) and that
the probability of a ￿rm optimizing prices is 25% (￿ = 0:75). Additionally, we consider ￿ = 0:25,
which is coincident to the average ratio of government consumption over GDP in the major developed
economies. Finally we parametrize ￿ = 0:96, and A = A￿ = 10.
We consider that monetary policy is chosen independently of the way ￿scal authorities choose tax
rates. That is, monetary policy is exogenous and given by Rt = Rsteady state.
4.1 The cooperative equilibrium
The policy objective of the central policy maker is the choice of both ￿scal instruments (￿t;￿￿
t)
that maximize the expected sum of life time utilities of both countries at time 0. Hence, the common





















































Equations (34) to (39); (42) to (51); (53) and (54)
12The optimal steady-state16 allocations are:
CC
H = 2:6231; C￿C
H = 2:6231
CC
F = 2:6231; C￿C
F = 2:6231
GC = 1:5792; G￿C = 1:5792
NC = 0:68253; N￿C = 0:68253
￿C = 0:27765; ￿￿C = 0:27765
￿C







UC = 0:9814; U￿C = 0:9814
UU;C = 0:9814
Given the hypothesis of symmetry that we impose, the optimal steady state allocations are iden-
tical in every country. This assumption and the symmetry of both aggregate goods, CH and CF;
(C￿
H and C￿
F) in the de￿nition of aggregate consumption17, leads to a relative price in the steady-state
equal to one.
4.2 The Nash equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium can be described by taking simultaneously the system of equations that
de￿ne the problem of the ￿scal policymaker in country H, and the equations that de￿ne the problem
of the ￿scal policymaker in country F; as those include clearing conditions. A natural way to represent
the Nash equilibrium of each country was to include as restrictions to the maximization problem, all
the equations that de￿ne the competitive equilibrium. However, to simplify the computations we ￿rst
analyze which restrictions are necessary to include in the problem of each country.
Proposition 1 Considering that the competitive equilibrium of a generic economy can be summarized
as the following system of 3 equations, where (X;P;￿) represents allocations, prices and policies,
F1 (X;P;￿) = 0
F2 (X￿;P;￿￿) = 0
F3 (P;￿;￿￿) = 0
The Nash equilibrium can be written as usual as (problem A):
max
￿ U (X (￿;￿￿)); for country H
max
￿￿ U￿ (X￿ (￿;￿￿)); for country F





F1 (X;P;￿) = 0
F3 (P;￿;￿￿) = 0
16That coincides with the steady-state of the cooperative equilibrium with ￿ exible prices.





F2 (X￿;P;￿￿) = 0
F3 (P;￿;￿￿) = 0
Proof. In appendix.
























Equations (34), (36), (38), (42), (44), (46), (48), (50), (53) and (54)




































Equations (35), (37), (39), (43), (45), (47), (49), (51), (53) and (54)
The main steady-state18 allocations are:
CN
H = 2:0019; C￿N
H = 2:0019
CN
F = 2:0019; C￿N
F = 2:0019
GN = 2:5037; G￿N = 2:5037
NN = 0:65075; N￿N = 0:65075
￿N = 0:4617; ￿￿N = 0:4617
￿N







UN = 0:9199; U￿N = 0:9199
UU;N = 0:9199
As seen before, and by the same reasoning described in the optimum cooperative equilibrium, we
observe that allocations are identical in both countries and relative price equals one. However when
we compare the steady state equilibrium in the cooperative case and in the Nash, we can observe
that they are quite di⁄erent. In the Cooperative equilibrium, countries have an incentive to reduce
the level of labor e⁄ort, increasing the tax rate on labor, which is the same as increasing government
expenditures. This interaction is ine¢ cient, creating lower consumption levels in the steady-state of the
Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the reduction of labor e⁄ort and the increase in government expenditures
is not su¢ cient to compensate the reduction in consumption levels, generating a lower level of utility
as compared to the cooperative equilibrium. This utility di⁄erence represents the deterministic gain.
18That coincides with the steady-state of the Nash equilibrium with ￿ exible prices.
144.3 Understanding the gain
4.3.1 Impulse response functions
To understand the response of optimal allocations to shocks we develop some exercises: ￿rst we
consider a common positive technology shock for both countries (represented in ￿gures 1 and 2) and
then we consider a positive technology shock in country H (represented in ￿gures 3 and 4). The blue
lines describe the Cooperative equilibrium and the green dotted lines the Nash equilibrium.
For the case of a common technology shock, we observe an increase in both tax rates in the moment
of the shock, followed by a reduction to a level below the steady-state. Finally, both tax rates converge
to their initial level. This path in common to the Cooperative and the Nash equilibrium. However,
the cooperative equilibrium tax rate is characterized by an higher initial increase, compared to the
Nash case. This occurs because in the Nash equilibrium each country does not take into account the
other country ￿scal policy, which imply a smaller movement of the tax rate in the Nash case. By
nature, government consumption mimics the path of the tax rates.
Notice that, as shocks are identical in both countries and we are considering equality among
countries, the e⁄ects on relative prices are symmetric, which imply constancy of terms of trade.
As regards labor, it slightly decreases in reaction to the shock because of the initial positive
income e⁄ect, then it increases above the steady state and it converges again to the initial level. We
also observe an increase in the consumption of both goods by both countries. Finally, the Union￿ s
Utility is characterized by an initial increase of less than 1% and my a smooth decrease towards the
steady-state level. However, the di⁄erence between the Nash and the cooperative equilibrium path of
this variable is not very large, which give us an hint for the small magnitude of the stochastic gain.
In ￿gures 3 and 4 we plot the impulse response function for a positive shock in the home country
(H). Again, labor slightly decreases in the more productive country (H), then it increases above the
steady state and it converges again to the initial level. We also observe an increase in the consumption
of good H (the good produced in the country that was subject to the shock). However, due to the
type of utility function used, consumption of good F does not change. Since we are considering a
logarithmic utility function in both types of consumption, the marginal utility of consuming a good
is independent of the other. Hence, the income e⁄ect does not propagate from one consumption good
to the other. However, the positive e⁄ect of the shock is passed to the other country (in this case F)
through the consumption of good H, which implies a slightly increase in relative prices in the moment
of the shock.
As regards ￿scal policy, we observe that the optimal strategy for the common ￿scal policymaker is
to increase labor taxes in the country that occurred the shock and to keep constant taxes in the other
country in order to obtain the same pattern of government expenditures. In the end, utility in both
countries temporarily increase.
Notice that although with di⁄erences in magnitude, the reactions to a shock in the Nash case are
similar to the coordinated case. This is so because with this setup the only variable that changes
in country F is consumption. As labor remains constant, country F does not have any incentive
in changing taxes, which implies that strategic interactions among individual ￿scal policymakers are
15Figure 1: Cooperative and Nash equilibrium impulse response functions of a simultaneous positive
technology shock in both countries.
Figure 2: Cooperative and Nash equilibrium impulse response functions of a simultaneous positive
technology shock in both countries (continuation).
16Figure 3: Cooperative and Nash equilibrium impulse response functions of a positive technology shock
in country H.
Total Deterministic Stochastic
Gain (%) Gain (%) % Gain (p.p.) %
Consumption
Equivalents
17:17% 17:16% 99:9% 0:0161 0:1%
Utility Gain 6:70% 6:69% 99:8% 0:0137 0:2%
Table 1: Decomposition of the cooperative gains
inexistent.
Therefore, we conclude that as the shape of the impulse response functions are very similar in the
Nash and in the cooperative case, ￿scal policy does not appear crucial as a stabilization device.
4.3.2 Simulations
We follow the method used in Salvado (2009) which consists of splitting the cooperative gain
into two main components: the deterministic gain and the stochastic gain. The stochastic gain is
computed as the mean of the gains that occur within 5.000 simulations19 of the approximate two
linearized models (the cooperative and the Nash) with the stochastic process for the state variables,
de￿ned in section 4.1.
We present the results in table 1. We observe that the deterministic gain accounts for more than
99:9% of total gains and represents an increase of 17:16% in consumption equivalents. However, the
stochastic component is small, representing an increase of 0:0161 p.p. in consumption equivalents,
that only represent 0:1% of total gains.
Therefore we see that, as shown in Salvado (2009) for a static model, the dynamics will not reverse
the results. The gain from using coordination of policies as a reaction to shocks is small. With this
19The results do not change signi￿cantly if we increase the number of simulations.
17Figure 4: Cooperative and Nash equilibrium impulse response functions of a positive technology shock
in country H (continuation).
example done here we can see how small this gain is.20
5 Conclusions
In this paper we compute the ￿scal coordination gain that would emerge in a Monetary Union.
Considering a Calvo price setting, and separating stabilization from the deterministic component, we
show that, the deterministic ￿scal coordination gains are always signi￿cative, whereas stabilization
gains are, on average, almost zero, representing 0:1% of total coordination gains, measured in con-
sumption equivalents. With this measurement we are able to quantify the gain that would occur
in a Monetary Union if ￿scal policy would be coordinated over the cycle. The cost of constructing
a common ￿scal authority and the incentives needed to impose harmonized policies instead of the
coordinated solution would for sure be higher. Therefore we conclude that, as is well known, chang-
ing volatility even when in comes from models with nominal rigidities has a small e⁄ect on welfare.
This result should then be robust to more complex environments. However, at the same time, as we
conclude that deterministic gains are high, ￿scal policy coordination on the choice and on the average
level of ￿scal instruments should be part of a common economic policy in a monetary union.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Nash equilibrium
A.1.1 Selection of the subset of restrictions
First let us consider for simplicity that we can describe the indirect utility function of a country
as depending only of a variable that per se depends on both countries policy instruments.
The problem of country H can be reduced to:
max
￿ U (X (￿;￿￿))






The problem of country F can be reduced to:
max
￿￿ U￿ (X￿ (￿;￿￿))




@￿￿ = 0 (56)
At the same time, we can describe the Nash problem of the country H as maximizing the utility
of country H subject to all the equilibrium conditions that de￿ne the competitive equilibrium of the





F1 (X;P;￿) = 0
F2 (X￿;P;￿￿) = 0
F3 (P;￿;￿￿) = 0
That is:
L = U (X) + ￿1F1 (X;P;￿) + ￿2F2 (X￿;P;￿￿) + ￿3F3 (P;￿;￿￿)
The optimum of this problem can be de￿ned as:
@L
@￿

















@N￿ = 0 , ￿2
@F2
@X￿ = 0 (59)
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= 0 , F1 (X;P;￿) = 0 (61)
@L
@￿2
= 0 , F2 (X￿;P;￿￿) = 0 (62)
@L
@￿3
= 0 , F3 (P;￿;￿￿) = 0 (63)
From equation 59 we obtain that ￿2 = 0 because @F￿























































































21Therefore we can conclude that the restriction F2 (X￿;P;￿￿) = 0 is not active in this problem and
hence we do not need to include it to obtain the same result.
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